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*Comms. L. 173 In recent months, there has been a continuing public focus on the law of libel. A
number of national newspapers have been pursuing campaigns seeking reform publishing regular
news items and comment articles;1 two freedom-of-speech NGOs - English PEN and Index on
Censorship - have conducted an inquiry and published an important report;2 two Parliamentary
debates have considered the theme,3 an eminent lawyer-peer is promising a libel reform Bill, and the
House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport has been undertaking an
extended study receiving evidence from a broad array of highly expert commentators.
In principle, we strongly welcome the debate. We too are concerned at the potential for misuse of libel
law so as to preclude investigative journalism, to stifle scientific and medical debate, to undermine the
important work of human rights organisations and other NGOs, or to invite a flood of legal tourists
from abroad. To the extent that the law allows powerful individuals or corporate entities to ‘chill’
important, warranted comment concerning themselves, their activities, their products or their ideas, it
is socially dysfunctional.4 We agree that it is timely for a general review of the operation and impact of
the law to be undertaken with the object of identifying necessary reform. We welcome the government
announcement that some form of review will be undertaken in this new year.
That all said, we consider that the critique of the libel regime is too one-sided and the reforms
proposed ill thought-out, too sweeping and indiscriminate. We are highly sceptical as to whether the
substantive law of libel contributes at all directly to the existence of the perceived problems. Where
once the law could be rightly lambasted as comprising ‘a surfeit of technicality, complexity and the
absurd’,5 the range of legislative and jurisprudential changes given effect over the last two decades
leaves any such critique dated and largely inappropriate. Similarly, while we appreciate the rhetorical
strength of the observation that some other jurisdictions have been moved to introduce legislation to
block the enforcement of British libel judgments, we do not consider it somehow ‘shaming’ that this
should be the case.6 In contrast, we do consider that the sheer cost of fighting libel actions -
especially with the opportunities for legal pressure and gamesmanship that this allows - can be a real
problem.
In this context, we have become concerned that the public commentary on libel law has been
remarkably one-sided and in some respects dangerously over-simplified. A number of causes
célèbres have been exploited - on occasion with little concern for the underpinning facts - in order to
secure superficial political impact.7 In our view, while the general call for reform has seemed
clamorous, specific proposals are often based either on a dearth of evidence or a partial
representation of the existing law. In consequence, we are nervous that the important societal
functions performed by libel law have been underplayed, and that ill-thought reforms may serve to
unbalance the public sphere to the detriment of all in the modern democratic state. Libel reform
should be coherent, not piecemeal and un(der)-principled.
We do not blame either Index on Censorship or English PEN for this state of affairs; the raison d'être
of such organisations is to promote the interests of writers and other contributors to public debate. It is
natural for such groups to emphasise expression interests and to seek a libel law that is least
constraining of speech. We are critical, however, of the performance of the print media. Over the past
year and more, newspapers have presented a singularly one-sided perspective.8 By casting their
commentary as campaigns, they have sought to validate their marginalisation of voices dissonant to
the editorial line on the imperative of reform. We would hope that the words of the great C P Scott
resonate: ‘the voice of opponents no less than that of friends has a right to be heard… it is well to be
frank; it is even better to be fair’.9 We suspect that they will not. These newspapers have subtly
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aggrandised their own vested interests as a reflection of the public good, and have chosen not to
seek to fulfil objectively any conception of their self-assumed role as the ‘fourth estate’. The fact is
that most complaints concerning damaging media inaccuracy and falsehood involve relatively
impecunious claimants who face an uneven legal battle against multinational media corporation
defendants.
Ultimately, we are interested to promote freedom of speech, but not freedom of all speech. The law
and other forms of regulation can legitimately, and indeed must, be used to prevent the media from
causing damage out of proportion to the good achieved by openness. In the immediate context, the
media should not be *Comms. L. 174 free to publish false and damaging allegations without any fear
of being put to redress. Any attempt to garner the public benefit that might be achieved by releasing
investigative journalists from the strictures of libel law risks absolving less reputable scribes of liability
for naked intrusions and falsehoods. If the law can draw - or redirect - the scorpion's sting, then
perhaps we'll all make it across the river.
In this paper, we seek to provide an accurate and nuanced view of the existing state of the law of
defamation. We do not claim that the law is perfect. We respond to the litany of criticisms made of the
law of libel in the hope of orienting any reform project towards aspects of the libel regime that may
productively be addressed. We are loathe to leave any such agenda-setting function exclusively in the
hands of those who stand to gain directly by the emasculation of the law. We are concerned that the
wholesale adoption of the existing range of proposals would result in the death of libel, a scenario that
we fear would truly unleash a feral beast.
We divide this rejoinder into sections. First, we highlight criticisms of libel law that we feel are based
on error or misunderstanding. Secondly, we respond to criticisms of libel law that we consider
misjudged. Thirdly, we highlight those aspects of the criticism that are potentially of substance, and
which are deserving of more full attention. We hope to identify those areas of libel law and procedure
that might be the focus of constructive revision, and by doing so dismiss as superfluous or worse
other mooted reforms. We preface these paragraphs with some short, general observations.
General observations
Before addressing directly particular elements of the critique of libel law and proposals for reform, we
make a number of related general comments about the existing state of the law in this area. First, the
critique of libel underplays the real importance of countervailing interests served through the design
and operation of the regime. These include personal interests in reputation and privacy, but also
wider public interests in the vindication of such personal rights and in the receipt of accurate
information from the media. There can only very rarely be any public interest in the receipt of false
information. Secondly, if one examines the development of the substantive law of defamation over the
last 15 years, it is striking that every major change has been in favour of greater media freedom.
These reforms have made it more difficult, less profitable, and hence less advisable for claimants to
sue. Finally, the essential coherence of English law with international standards is reflected in the
jurisprudence of international rights organisations. The analytical benchmark provided by the United
States is questionable; that jurisdiction adopts an unusual and absolutist approach to the preservation
of freedom of speech.
Importance of reputation
Given the purposes of the organisations involved in the campaign for libel reform, it is unsurprising
that the interest in freedom of expression receives the greatest emphasis. The general failure of
newspapers and the Index/PEN report to acknowledge competing social values - save occasionally to
state that reputation is not expressly enumerated as a right under the European Convention on
Human Rights - is, however, self-serving and myopic. On one hand, it ignores the developing body of
jurisprudence in both the Strasbourg and domestic courts to the effect that reputation is a protected
interest under Article 8 ECHR.10 On the other hand, and more importantly, it fails properly to value the
importance of reputation. The Index/PEN report does allow that ‘the state is responsible for finding an
appropriate balance between free speech and the protection of reputation.’ 11 In our view, the
proponents of the libel reform campaign do not themselves entertain any such balancing exercise.
Harm to reputation can be debilitating and perpetuating. Should such harm be caused by the
circulation of falsehoods, society has an interest in facilitating redress. Reputation, as Lord Nicholls
explained in Reynolds v Times Newspapers, does matter, and not merely for its service to the
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individual concerned:
‘Reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of the individual. It also forms the basis of
many decisions in a democratic society which are fundamental to its well-being: whom to employ or
work for, whom to promote, whom to do business with or to vote for. Once besmirched by an
unfounded allegation in a national newspaper, a reputation can be damaged for ever, especially if
there is no opportunity to vindicate one's reputation. When this happens, society as well as the
individual is the loser. For it should not be supposed that protection of reputation is a matter of
importance only to the affected individual and his family. Protection of reputation is conducive to the
public good. It is in the public interest that the reputation of public figures should not be debased
falsely. In the political field, in order to make an informed choice, the electorate needs to be able to
identify the good as well as the bad.’12
In light of this, it is important to acknowledge that the creation of a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of
expression is precisely the purpose of libel law. It prevents unwarranted injury to reputation by means
of incautious speech.
Any well-structured law of defamation must account for the competing interests at stake. English law
is not perfect, but the fact is that the existing law offers a much more satisfactory balance between
these competing interests than does the vision proposed by the proponents of sweeping reform. The
chilling effect of libel is undesirable only to the extent that it causes true and important information to
be withheld from the public sphere. Change the law by all means, but do not do so on the basis of
only a partial understanding of the existing law or with an unhealthy bias towards freedom of
expression.
Pro-media revision of English libel law
The most obvious changes in libel law have come in relation to the curtailment of damages and the
development of Reynolds ‘public interest’ privilege.13 Whereas 20 years ago libel claims may have
been seen by some claimants as a road to untaxed riches, this is no longer the case. The Court of
Appeal now exercises considerable control over the level of damages,14 with the effective maximum
now just over £200k.15 Moreover, the award of even half that amount is a rare occurrence.16 Given
that most libel damages are modest and the claimant only recovers a proportion of his costs, even
successful libel litigants are often left out of pocket. The development of Reynolds privilege and the
related ‘reportage’ defence17 have widened substantially the room for error afforded to the media
when reporting on matters of public interest. Provided that the journalist has acted responsibly and
that the matter considered is of public interest, the defence is available.
*Comms. L. 175 There have been a number of further ‘pro-media’ reforms. The defence of ‘fair
comment’ has been revitalised and is more accommodating of free speech than previously.18 Certain
legal entities have been found to lack the capacity to bring a claim for defamation,19 and others
treated as effectively libel proof.20 The enactment of the ‘offer of amends’ procedure enables a media
defendant that ‘has got something wrong’ to apologise, and for so doing to get a substantial reduction
on the damages that it would otherwise have to pay.21 The ‘summary disposal’ procedure under
section 8 of the Defamation Act 1996 allows a court, in practice usually on application by the
defendant, to weed out weak cases at a relatively early stage. These and other changes warrant the
conclusion that the last 20 years have seen a radical shift in the balance of power in defamation
claims. The importance of freedom of speech is now more fully reflected in the law than was formerly
the case. One consequence has been that it is now more difficult to bring a successful libel claim.
Coherence of English libel law with international norms
The Index/PEN report offers a compelling and powerful rendition of the value of freedom of speech.22
It locates the principle as a cornerstone of democracy, an expectation that must be vouchsafed in
practice if the state and the otherwise powerful are to be properly held to account. That journalists
should have a central role to play in this exercise is obvious. We agree with the assertion in the report
that ‘so long as [the media] exercise that role responsibly, the public interest is served better by a
liberal regulatory regime that allows occasional mistakes, than by a stricter regime that curtails media
freedom.” 23 We part company with the report, however, insofar as it asserts that freedom of
expression is not properly valued by the English law of defamation. As noted above, changes in the
law over the last 20 years have significantly re-balanced libel law in favour of media freedom. English
law has not been found significantly deficient in terms of its compliance with international standards of
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human rights protection in cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights.24 Indeed,
when compared with the laws of other jurisdictions that have ratified the European Convention (and
more generally), English law can be seen to offer significantly greater protection for freedom of
expression than most.
There are observable differences when comparing the law of England and Wales with that of the
United States.25 Exceptionalism in this respect, however, is generally recognised as being American
in flavour. Bound by the First Amendment of the US Constitution, American courts have adopted what
can be reasonably described as a fundamentalist approach to the value of freedom of expression. In
this ‘sanctification’ of freedom of speech, the United States utilises a curiously weighted balance in
the determination of competition between expression and other social values. There is therefore a
heavy burden placed on those who argue for reform by reference to American law to prove that, of all
the jurisdictions in the world, the United States has things right in this regard.
Criticism of the libel regime: errors and misunderstandings
In our view, a number of criticisms made of the English libel regime are based upon errors or
misunderstandings of the existing legal position. These include points regarding the need for revision
of the existing rules on jurisdiction, for improvement of the public interest defence, for broadening of
the defence of fair comment, and for the exemption of internet hosts and online interactive chat from
liability.
Revising the rules on jurisdiction
Perhaps the most often voiced critique of the English defamation regime is that due to the laxity of its
jurisdictional rules it encourages the phenomenon of so-called ‘libel-tourism’. This was characterised
by Lord Pannick in House of Lords debate as the bringing of proceedings ‘by people who have no
connection to this country against publishers who are based abroad, such proceedings being founded
on the incidental publication in this country of a few copies of a newspaper, book or magazine
published abroad.’ 26 The authors of the Index/PEN report also suppose that the jurisdictional rules
‘[expose] the English legal system to abuse by claimants with no reputation to defend in this country.’
27 The fact that other jurisdictions - viz some states28 and possibly the federal Congress of the USA29 -
have been moved to introduce legislation to block the enforcement of British libel judgments is also
often cited as confirmation of a supposed expansionist asininity of English law.30
We appreciate the rhetorical strength of the observation that some foreign claimants choose to sue in
London and not in their home jurisdictions. The implication that the regime in this country is draconian
is obvious. On analysis, however, we are not persuaded that the British rules on jurisdiction that are
said to permit libeltourism are in themselves at all problematic.
Contrary to the rules sometimes posited, the British courts in fact require the claimant to demonstrate,
first, that he or she does possess a reputation in this jurisdiction,31 and secondly that defamatory
publication has occurred here.32 Any damages recovered will relate only to the harm caused to the
reputation held in this jurisdiction. The courts have a discretion to strike out a claim as an abuse of
process where no ‘real and substantial tort’ has been committed. This is not mere puffery; the
discretion has been exercised in a number of recent cases.33
Admittedly, under these rules jurisdiction is assumed more readily than would be deemed appropriate
by some. In terms of damage to reputation, however, what often matters is not the extent of
publication, but rather who is reading material at a given time. As noted by Mr Justice Eady in Mardas
v New York Times, ‘whether there has been a real and substantial tort… cannot depend [solely] upon
a numbers game.’34 The Index/Pen report proposes that libel cases should be heard in this jurisdiction
only if it can be shown that at least 10 per cent of the total number of copies of the publication
distributed have been circulated here35 . They also propose that statements made on foreign internet
sites should be actionable only when they are advertised or promoted here by the publisher. To our
minds, such rules would be entirely arbitrary and unprincipled. They would result in obvious injustices,
and would envision the legitimisation of the wanton traducing of individual reputations.
At its most basic level, therefore, we are comfortable with the phenomenon of libel tourism. It reflects
a divergence of view as to the priorities to be afforded to freedom of expression on one hand, and
competing interests such as those in privacy and reputation on the other. Americans are free to
choose free speech absolutism; we remain content to be more balanced in our estimation of the
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relative importance of competing interests.
A more powerful complaint open to overseas defendants concerns not the fact of embroilment in
British legal proceedings, but the scale of legal costs that they face when this occurs. We would be
particularly concerned about this issue where threats to sue are made by powerful overseas interests
on the basis of legal *Comms. L. 176 argument that is tenuous at best with the aim of precluding
critical comment here or in other jurisdictions regarding their activities. The law should not support the
efforts of cheats, bullies or tyrants. A resolution of this issue does not, however, require amendment
of rules on jurisdiction. These distinct matters are discussed below.
Introduction of an improved public interest defence
Proponents of libel reform sometimes call for the introduction of a public interest defence for
journalists. To suggest that there is no robust public interest defence, however, is simply wrong. The
House of Lords has provided - in Reynolds v Times Newspapers, 36 as bolstered by Jameel v Wall
Street Journal Europe 37 - a defence of privilege where the subject matter of the publication is of
public interest and those involved in the publication have acted responsibly in seeking to determine
the accuracy of their stories. Thus, even where statements made are factually incorrect and seriously
defamatory, liability can be avoided. To give an example, the publication of a story by a newspaper
citing documents that implicate a British MP in war crimes would be protected by privilege even if the
documents were fake provided that the newspaper had taken reasonable care to establish the
authenticity of the documents or simply reported the fact of the discovery in a neutral and balanced
way.38
In its discussion of this theme, the Index/PEN report calls for the ‘strengthening’ of the existing public
interest defence.39 First, it is suggested that the defence should be based upon a journalist's belief in
the truth and public importance of his or her story. Secondly, it is recommended that when applying
the Reynolds defence courts should take into account the capacity of the defendant to follow all the
steps required. We have serious reservations as to the first of these suggestions, and a short
comment to make in respect of the second.
The first Index/PEN suggestion would see the public interest defence rest on two elements: the
journalist's view on the public interest, and his or her belief in the truth of the story. In the first respect,
we do not see a strong rationale for moving away from the current position. Relying solely on the
judgment of the journalist or editor may leave the test subject to the inclinations and interests of the
particular publication. That said, while the current law provides for the court to determine the issue,
the legal tests are generous on this point,40 and senior judges have acknowledged the importance of
the professional experience of journalistic and editorial staff.41 As Lord Nicholls put it in Reynolds, ‘the
court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the public interest and, therefore, the
public had no right to know… [and] any lingering doubts should be resolved in favour of publication.’42
We doubt whether the proposed change would result in many different outcomes in practice.
In the second respect, a journalist's honest belief in the truth of what he or she is publishing must be a
necessary condition of any public interest defence, but it surely cannot be a sufficient one. Basing the
defence merely on the journalist's honest belief as to truth would be a recipe for sloppy journalism in
which there would be no incentive for initial, seemingly persuasive sources and indications to be
further checked. The existing defence requires the journalist to have validated his or her faith in the
story by engaging in reasonable journalistic practice. This seems the more appropriate standard when
what is contemplated is the exoneration from liability for misinforming the public and damaging
without justification another person's reputation.
As to the second proposal made in the Index/PEN report - that the law should take into account the
capacity of the defendant to follow all the steps required for a Reynolds defence, so as to recognise
for example that defendants writing about totalitarian regimes may not be able to corroborate their
reports safely - the short answer is that this is already the case. In Jameel, their Lordships made clear
that ‘the standard of conduct required of [the media] must be applied in a practical and flexible
manner… [i]t must have regard to practical realities’.43 This may include taking account of the
particular difficulty in certain regimes of getting to the truth.44
Introduction of a broader defence of fair comment
Proponents of libel reform sometimes suggest that the defence of fair comment should be expanded.
Page5
The authors of the Index/PEN report suggest that the defence should be broadened and relaxed. We
suggest that this is to misunderstand the existing law. To rely on the defence of fair comment, the
defendant must establish that the defamatory statement involves a comment (and not a fact), that it is
based on true facts, and that it concerns a matter of public interest.45 Upon doing so, he or she is
entitled to rely on the defence assuming the absence of malice. Fair comment, unsurprisingly, does
not protect false imputations of fact; such can be defended only as being true or protected by
privilege.46 Fair comment is intended, quite properly, to protect those who express their opinion on
events, even if those opinions are irrational, extreme and prejudiced.47 Newspaper columnists who dip
their pens in gall to excoriate public figures deemed to have committed some moral failure are
protected by the defence. The fact that they express themselves intemperately will not usually
preclude the defence. It is surely right, however, that they should not be free to concoct facts upon
which their comment is then based.
It is suggested that in applying the defence, courts ‘should be looking at the context in which a piece
is published in order to determine whether it is intended or likely to be read as a statement of fact, or
one of comment’.48 Such a suggestion is puzzling as this is exactly what the courts do.49 Judges have
not tended in recent cases to be overly analytical in determining the nature of given statements.50
Indeed, the test applied - how would the statement be interpreted by a reasonable reader - actively
discourages over-analysis.51 Moreover, the requirement that the comment be ‘fair’ is very easily met.
Fairness in this context does not require that a reasonable man would regard the comment as fair.
Instead, the statement need only be one that any man however prejudiced and obstinate could
honestly make. To our minds, the existing defence adequately reflects the interest in freedom of
speech.
Exempting internet hosts and service providers, and interactive chat
The suggestion that the law of defamation has not responded in an appropriate way to the arrival of
the internet is simply wrong.52 The courts, Parliament and government have responded in ways that
hold an appropriate balance between encouraging freedom of expression and maintaining an
appropriate respect for reputation. Specifically, the Index/PEN report appears to suggest - on both
following points the report is unclear - either that (i) internet hosts should be liable for defamatory
content only in the same way as might offline distributors and that (ii) defamatory interactive chat
should be treated as slander and not libel, or that both (a) internet hosts and (b) interactive chat
should be entirely free from potential liability for defamation.53
If the intention of the authors was to propose the former rules, we agree, and so does the current law.
Firstly, section 1 of the *Comms. L. 177 Defamation Act 1996 and the Electronic Commerce (EC
Directive) Regulations give wide immunity from liability to internet service providers who merely act as
conduits of information provided by others.54 Where such providers act as hosts of third party material
(and therefore have real control over the content), they are immune from liability if they have no
knowledge of the defamatory material. Should they be informed of the defamatory content, they
remain immune from suit if they act expeditiously to remove the material. Secondly, operators of
internet search engines, such as Google, Altavista or AskJeeves, are not treated as ‘publishers’ at
common law. Therefore, they cannot be held liable where in response to an internet search the
search engine provides a snippet of information that is defamatory of a claimant.55 Thirdly, although
the issue has not been determined finally, a court has already indicated that online interactive chat
should be treated as a slander and therefore only actionable on proof of special damage.56
If the intention of the authors was to suggest the latter two propositions (that both internet hosts and
interactive chat should be entirely free from liability for defamation), then we demur. We can see no
reason in principle to differentiate between defamatory statements by reference to the platform across
which they are communicated. We recognise, of course, that irrespective of the legal position
problems of extra-territoriality may in practice frustrate any attempt to pursue a legal claim.
Criticism of the libel regime: misjudgments
In our view, a number of criticisms made of the English libel regime are based upon misjudgments.
These include points regarding the reallocation of the burden of proof as to truth/falsity, and the
proposal to cap libel damages.
Reallocating the burden of proof - removing the presumption of falsity 57
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In much of the critique of libel law, the issue of the burden of proof is pressed to the fore. It is asserted
that it is inappropriate for the falsity of the impugned statement to be presumed, and for the defendant
to be required to justify the statement if he or she is to avoid liability.58 This is said to be an inversion
of the normal rule that an individual will be innocent until proven guilty. When this appealing rhetoric is
analysed, however, it swiftly collapses into a question of perspective. A presumption of truth can
equally be cast as an assumption that the person concerning whom a statement is made is guilty as
charged in the trial by media, and that they deserve the lowered reputation. We query whether
freedom of expression really demands that the media defendant be entitled to a presumption that a
person deserves a bad reputation unless the contrary is established.
In our view, the presumption that an impugned statement is false is the preferable starting point.
Placing the burden of proving the truth of an imputation on the defendant forces a publisher, when
considering whether or not to publish, to focus particular attention on whether the statement can be
justified. If a potentially damaging statement cannot be justified, then it becomes difficult to identify the
compelling public interest in permitting it to be made. If a potentially damaging statement can be
justified in part only or if provable facts warrant only a call for further investigation, then any statement
made should not jump to wider conclusions. Without such a legal responsibility, speech would
become cheap and the proper restraints placed on the media, or indeed any person, when making
serious allegations would be undesirably loosened. Proponents of a reallocation of the burden of
proof assert that the claimant will always be better placed to demonstrate falsity than the defendant
the converse.59 This is palpably not always true; rather it will depend entirely on the nature of the
imputation made.
In addition, the defence of truth should not be considered in isolation. A defendant who cannot prove
the truth of what has been published is nevertheless entitled to rely on the defence of Reynolds
privilege, provided that the statement made concerns a matter of public interest and that he or she
has met the standards of responsible journalism. Similarly, considerable leeway is allowed to the
media where opinions on matters of public interest are published. All that is required is that the
comment is one that a reasonable person could honestly hold.
Moreover, it is instructive that it is not only English law that continues to regard the presumption of
falsity as a necessary feature of the law of defamation. Canada and South Africa, for example, both
continue to place a burden of proof of truth on the defendant.60 Australia, which has recently
conducted a major review and modernisation of its law of defamation, has also retained the
presumption of falsity.61 The European Court of Human Rights has stated on several occasions that to
place on a defendant in libel proceedings the onus of proving to the civil standard the truth of
defamatory statements is not in principle incompatible with Article 10 ECHR62 . Even in the United
States, the jurisdiction that has gone further than any other country in the world in privileging freedom
of expression over the protection of reputation, the majority of states still retain the presumption of
falsity where a private claimant sues a non-media defendant on a matter of private concern.63
Remedies: capping libel damages
Damages in the English law of defamation are generally awarded only to compensate the victim for
the injury suffered as a consequence of the untrue statement.64 Unlike torts where the wrong causes
loss of earnings or damaged property, however, the quantification of damages in libel and slander
cases is by no means straightforward. It is not obvious how one should evaluate the damage to
reputation caused by a seriously untrue and defamatory statement, or the hurt and distress caused,
or the sum necessary to vindicate a claimant's reputation.
On these difficult questions, different views may legitimately be held and it is reasonable here to talk
only in terms of general parameters. At the upper limit, we would agree with the Index/PEN report that
an award of damages ought not to be a road to untaxed riches. As noted above, the Court of Appeal
has in recent years sought to dampen the escalation of awards made by juries so that the effective
maximum is now around £200k. In fact, an analysis of the awards made between June 1997 and
January 2009 indicates that the mean award was just short of £48k, while the median award was
£25k.65 The mean award since January 2004 was under £38k, and the median award just over £20k.
66
At the same time, awards should be adequate to serve the need for compensation for harms caused.
Various proponents of libel reform have proposed that a cap be placed on the quantum of damages
available in libel actions. For instance, Denis MacShane MP has suggested a limit of £10k.67 The
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Index/PEN report also suggests a cap of £10,000, but with room for additional sums where special
damage can be proven and provision for an apology remedy.
To our minds, this level of damages cap is seriously flawed. First, there is precious little evidence that
any claimants regard *Comms. L. 178 their actions as being “more about making money than saving
a reputation”68 . In most cases, as any responsible lawyer will inform his or her client, a claimant who
wins a contested trial would be fortunate to be in surplus after a detailed assessment of costs. Even
successful claimants are usually left with some measure of cost burden. Moreover, damage awards
have decreased substantially over the last decade, and have been pegged at the level of general
damages in personal injury cases.69 The courts have emphasised repeatedly the need to avoid
excessive awards, and it is only in the most serious of cases that six figure awards are made.
We are not averse to a cap on damages in principle. Neither are we committed to the existing
effective cap of circa £200k. We note, however, that the only other major common law jurisdiction that
limits non-economic damages - Australia - has set its cap at $250k (approximately £120k).70 We also
note that alongside his recommendations on limiting costs in civil actions, Lord Justice Jackson has
recently recommended that the standard quantum of damages be increased by 10 per cent.71 We
doubt the wisdom of any suggestion that £10k could reasonably serve as adequate compensation for
two social workers wrongly accused of child abuse, driven from their homes, and subjected to a
hostile campaign lasting for several years in the local and national press,72 or for the parents of the
abducted child Madeleine McCann, repeatedly accused by sections of the national media of
complicity in that abduction and possibly in murder.
Restricting the compensation available in libel actions to too low a level may also have pathological
consequences. We would be concerned that a cap of £10k would leave the repercussions of even the
most serious libel almost negligible for an international media company. If, in the absence of both
effective alternative regulatory mechanisms and adequate alternative remedial options, one of the
functions of the law of libel is to discourage irresponsible journalism, damages need to be set at a
level that encourages the taking of due care. The envisaged cap is woefully inadequate to perform
this function and may well lead to the excesses of the early 1990s that characterised some sections
of the British press.
By way of footnote, we note that the authors of the Index/PEN report also suggest that the primary
remedy in libel actions should be the correction and/or apology.73 Insofar as the purpose of libel
remedies is to offer vindication, this is an appealing and possibly a sustainable point. We note,
however, that corrections or apologies made would necessarily have to be allowed equivalent
exposure as the original defamation and that satisfactory performance of this remedy would require to
be overseen by some regulatory mechanism. Moreover, the purposes of libel remedies as currently
understood quite properly extend beyond vindication alone.
Points of substance for further consideration
Of the various criticisms of existing libel law and proposals for reform, we consider that only a limited
number involve points of substance. In our view, however, these points are deserving at least of
further consideration in an appropriate policy forum. We are encouraged that the government has
established a working group to contemplate libel reform, and urge that the following issues form part
of their considerations. That said, we do not ourselves necessarily advocate change in any of these
respects: the introduction of a single publication rule for online publication; the introduction of a
specialised libel tribunal or other cost-saving process change; the denial of standing to corporate
entities; relieving the costs burden, and introducing legislation to permit defendants to counter-sue
abusive libel claimants.
Single publication rule for online publication
Under English libel law, ‘publication’ occurs on each occasion that a statement is accessed as
opposed to the occasion on which it is - in lay terms - published. This is the Duke of Brunswick
/multiple publication rule.74 In the context of the maintaining of online digital archives by traditional
media companies, this rule results in a heightened legal risk that is arguably undesirable given the
social benefit delivered by such archives. In the wake of the Loutchansky litigation and the
subsequent action brought by Times Newspapers before the Strasbourg court,75 there have been
calls for the introduction of a single publication rule for online publication. The government conducted
a consultation on this theme in late 200976 .
Page8
In a response to the government consultation, we concluded that the case for abolition of the multiple
publication rule was not made out. We do not agree that the current rule ‘defies common sense’.
Instead, we concluded that an almost equally simple and efficacious alternative solution was available
and suggested the introduction of a new defence of ‘non-culpable republication’ alongside retention of
the multiple publication rule. Subject to certain conditions, this defence would extend not only to
online archive publishers but also potentially to other authors whose work is replicated by others
across the internet.77
We considered that a single publication rule (even with an extended limitation period) would not
always allow for an appropriate balance to be struck between Article 10 rights to communicative
freedom and competing rights to privacy and reputation. A single publication rule would automatically
absolve both the author and the host of an impugned archive statement of any responsibility for its
making after the requisite limitation period following first publication. We did not consider that this is
appropriate. Not every author of a defamatory statement - or every archivist of online content - is
deserving of exoneration from liability. In the online environment, the availability of past statements
can continue to be horrendously damaging.78 At whatever remove it is made from the first uploading
of the impugned statement, each reading has the potential to harm the reputation of the person
defamed.
Like the authors of the Index/PEN report, we welcomed the government's consultation initiative and
await the outcome of the exercise with interest. We recommend that the government working party on
libel reform attend to this issue.
Introduction of a specialised libel tribunal or other cost-saving process change
Proponents of libel reform sometimes suggest that some alternative forum for the resolution of libel
disputes should be introduced. To the extent that it may result in lowered process costs, greater
access to justice for claimants, and a retained balance between interests in freedom of expression
and reputation/privacy in terms of outcomes and remedies, this is an interesting idea that may well be
worthy of more full examination.
Insofar as the purpose of such a move would be to lower costs, we note that the introduction of
effective media self- or co-regulatory system that was able to secure fairness between parties and
adequate remedies may be equally effective for most cases. We note that the existing regulatory
regime for broadcast advertising *Comms. L. 179 comprises an effective arrangement of the latter
type between Ofcom and the Advertising Standards Authority. We recognise the shortcoming that any
such regime would not be open to non-media libel defendants.
Similarly, the rationalisation of the existing libel process may prove as fruitful as the introduction of a
specialised tribunal. Such rationalisation might involve procedural and/or substantive legal change
aimed at reducing costs. We note for example - and admittedly on the basis of anecdotal evidence -
that in most cases the determination of the meaning of putatively defamatory statements is an
exercise that consumes a very large proportion of lawyers' preparatory and court time. In terms of
procedure, for example, if meaning was determined by the judge only then time-consuming and
wasteful duplication of argument before the jury could be avoided. We note the point mooted by Lord
Justice Jackson on the possible future removal of the jury from libel trials altogether.79
Revision of the substantive law may have similar effect on the time and cost spent on determination
of meaning. For example, it might reasonably be determined that the purpose of damages would
henceforth be to compensate only for (a) the claimant's upset and harm to self-esteem caused by the
perception that others would consider them less highly as a result of the defamation, and (b) any
proven special damage. Should any such conception of the purpose of libel remedies be adopted, the
question of meaning would become straightforward: on one hand, it would be simply the meaning
inferred by the claimant, while on the other it would be the actual meaning inferred by those whose
responses occasioned the effective financial loss. The question for the court would shift to being only
that of whether the meaning inferred by the claimant was a reasonable one or rather a strained
product of an overly sensitive mind.80 The upshot would be a foreshortened, and hence a less costly
libel process.
We do not wish ourselves to sponsor any of the foregoing suggestions, but do recommend that the
government working party on libel reform attend to these possibilities.
In this regard, by way of aside for the sake of accuracy, we also highlight that the claim made in the
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Index/PEN report that there are currently few viable alternatives to a full trial is misleading.81 At
present, a number of such alternatives to a full trial do exist. We identify these below. Moreover, it
should also be emphasised that the number of cases that do reach a full trial is tiny. Each year,
slightly in excess of 200 cases are initiated before the High Court.82 Others will of course have been
threatened, but will have come to nothing or been settled without the need to commence a claim. Of
those that are initiated, the vast majority will be settled or disposed of by means other than full trial.
According to Mr Justice Eady, there have been only four full trials in each of the last two years.83 It
seems fanciful given these facts to suggest that alternatives to full trial do not exist.
Beyond setling a claim informally, there are three key routes to early resolution of libel actions. First,
the court is required to further the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules by active case
management and this includes encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution
procedure such as mediation or arbitration if that is appropriate.84 Moreover, parties are given the
opportunity when filling in the allocation questionnaire to request a stay of the proceedings for one
month to try to settle the claim by ADR or other means.85 A failure to take the use of ADR seriously,
particularly if the court has suggested this, is likely to have serious cost consequences for a party that
has refused to take part.86
Secondly, either party may apply to have the case dismissed under the summary disposal procedure
established by the Defamation Act 1996.87 The Act requires that every defamation action must come
before a judge at an early stage so that it can be decided whether the case is suitable for summary
disposal even where the parties have not asked for such an assessment. Where the summary
disposal procedure is used, the maximum sum recoverable by way of damages is £10,000.88
Thirdly, a defendant who realises that he has defamed the claimant and wishes to dispose of the
claim as quickly as possible can use the ‘offer of amends’ procedure contained in sections 2-4 of the
Defamation Act 1996. Under this procedure, the defendant must make a suitable offer of amends and
undertake to pay the claimant's costs and a sum by way of damages. A failure to accept a suitable
offer on the part of the claimant gives the defendant a defence in any subsequent proceedings.89
Where the parties cannot agree an appropriate sum by way of damages, this will be fixed by the court
applying the ordinary principles of assessment save that a discount (usually around 40-50%) will be
applied to reflect the fact that the defendant apologised in a timely fashion.90
Denying corporations the right to sue
The question as to whether corporate entities should be allowed standing to sue for libel is an
interesting issue, and one which is certainly worthy of further consideration. The authors of the
Index/PEN report suggest that corporations should be free to sue for malicious falsehood only.91 In
contrast to defamation, this tort requires the claimant to prove malice, falsehood and special damage,
although there is no need to show that the statement was defamatory.92 In support of this proposition,
they draw an analogy between such entities and public bodies (which are not currently allowed
standing to sue), and cite the example of Australia that has recently restricted standing to private
groupings that employ no more than 10 people.93 We would add that larger corporations may often
have other means available - for example, through advertising or by utilising sophisticated public
relations machinery to access the public sphere through the media and other routes - to counteract
inaccurate claims.
Nevertheless, we also note that Australia is the only major jurisdiction that has seen fit to prevent
claims by trading companies. The European Court of Human Rights has held that allowing a large
multinational company to sue in defamation does not constitute a breach of Article 10.94 Even the
United States continues to allow claims to be brought by corporate entities, and in many cases a
corporation would be treated as a private figure free from the New York Times v Sullivan requirement
to prove actual malice against a media defendant.95
Moreover, there is arguably very good reason to continue to allow corporations to sue. The good
name of a company, perhaps even more than that of an individual, is a thing of value. A damaging
libel may make a company less attractive for investors to invest in, employees to work for, and
customers to deal with. As investor and philanthropist Warren Buffett famously noted, ‘it takes 20
years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it.’ There is nothing repugnant in the notion that
this value is something that the law should protect.
It may be that a middle route would be to require corporations to prove special damage - that is, that
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they have suffered actual or likely financial loss - as a result of the defamatory comment.96 We note,
however, that this may pose a ‘catch-22’. A damaging publication about a company will be less likely
to result in *Comms. L. 180 provable financial loss in cases where the issue of proceedings is
prompt and their pursuit diligent. The company would therefore have an incentive to allow the
damage to accrue before acting, or by proceeding quickly would extinguish the basis of their claim.
Again, we recommend that the government working party on libel reform attend to this issue.
Relieving the costs burden
Perhaps the single most significant complaint regarding the current libel regime in England and Wales
is the cost of embroilment in proceedings. Costs of proceedings here are said to be four times as high
as the next most expensive European state (Ireland), and 140 times the average cost in other
European jurisdictions.97 Estimates vary, but it is not uncommon for it to be suggested that contested
actions may result in costs bills that run into the millions of pounds. As a matter of logic, the upshot is
likely to be that there will be financial incentives to settle cases irrespective of the merits of the claim.
For even well-heeled defendants, the potential cost of defending a libel action may sometimes be
prohibitive.
The main factors that are said to contribute to the cost of proceedings are the protracted nature of
libel proceedings, and the high base costs charged by specialist libel lawyers. In addition, where
utilised, conditional fee agreements (CFAs) permit the charging of an uplift on costs (the ‘success
fee’) of up to 100 per cent (although in practice this uplift would rarely exceed a figure of half that).
Moreover, ‘after-the-event’ (ATE) insurance premiums that protect the users of CFAs against the risk
of incurring the costs burden associated with losing the case can also be charged to the losing party.
The explanation as to why libel actions are so costly is contested. We note that only a tiny proportion
of cases commenced ever go to trial thereby incurring the highest levels of costs. The vast majority
settle in the early stages, with only very moderate costs being incurred. The attitude manifested by
the defendant when faced with a claim is often the most important determinant of the eventual cost of
the proceedings. In the scenario where the defendant accepts there has been a mistake, an early
apology and offer of appropriate compensation will usually result in costs that are moderate and
proportionate. Should cases be fought, whether unreasonably or because the defendant wishes to
stand behind the publication, then costs can mount substantially. Importantly, the UK costs regime
raises significant disincentives against claimants pursuing unreasonable damages claims. Where a
reasonable offer of compensation (a Part 36 offer) made to a claimant is refused and the court later
determines that continuation of the case was unreasonable, there will be a heavy penalty by way of
an award of costs.98 Overall, this position does mean that it will often be the hard cases - those in
which both parties believe fully in the persuasiveness of their legal cases - that result in the highest
costs.
The proponents of libel reform often call for the costs issue to be addressed. For example, in the
Index/PEN report it is suggested that success fees should not be chargeable, base costs should be
capped, and ATE premiums should not be recoverable.99 We fully understand and share the desire to
reduce the costs of libel actions. We would be concerned, however, that bald reforms of this nature
would so disincentivise claimant lawyers as to result in the withdrawal of offers to act on CFAs with
attendant repercussions for access to justice for most claimants. We would be concerned that the
government's recent proposal to limit ‘success fees’ to a maximum 10 per cent uplift on costs may
have this effect.100 If it becomes law, we would hope that this measure serves only as an interim step
prior to wider reform based perhaps on Lord Justice Jackson's recommendations. We are loathe to
see libel become once again exclusively a rich man's law.
The government has recently initiated a mandatory 12 month costs budgeting pilot for defamation
cases,101 and moreover the Jackson report on civil litigation costs - with its sophisticated array of
proposals designed to remedy the costs burden - has just been published.102 We do not intend in this
paper to comment in detail on that report, but note that his reflection of the issues seems markedly
more balanced than those that are sometimes aired in newspaper articles and elsewhere. We hope
and expect that these reviews will culminate in reforms that will serve to reduce the costs of libel
proceedings while promoting access to justice for all parties. We do not expect, however, that this can
be achieved in such a way as to affect by orders of magnitude the costs of the libel regime in the
absence of some more fundamental reform of the law and procedures by which reputations are
balanced against freedom of expression.
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Legislation to permit defendants to countersue abusive libel claimants
A primary complaint raised by the proponents of libel reform is that the law can be used to coerce
journalists and others to pressure them against bringing to public attention important information
regarding the activities of the powerful. This is precisely the claim made by Index on Censorship and
English PEN regarding recent actions involving, for example, human rights NGOs, members of the
scientific and medical communities and others. Without intending any prejudice to live cases, we
acknowledge that such behaviour does from time to time occur although we do not see evidence that
it is typical of libel claimants generally.
As evident from the above discussion, in our view the substantive law of libel can no longer be said to
facilitate such improper designs. We recognise, however, that for some defendants the sheer cost of
embroilment in libel proceedings can have that effect. Rather than tinker with the law of libel to avoid
this possibility (or perhaps, quite aside from any libel reform deemed necessary), we would prefer that
thought be given to tackling such abuse of the legal process directly.
The abusive use of the legal process to deter important public interest comment has long been
recognised in other jurisdictions. Indeed, in studying the phenomenon two American professors have
adopted the inelegant but informative terminology of the SLAPP, or ‘strategic lawsuit against public
participation’.103 US judges have been watchful for instances of such abuse, recognising that it can be
a most effective weapon. As one American judge has explained, ‘short of a gun to the head, a greater
threat to [freedom of expression] can scarcely be imagined’.104 A similar deterrent jurisprudence has
developed under the Canadian Charter of Rights.
British judges also arguably enjoy the right to assess the motivations underlying actions taken by
litigants and to strike out SLAPPs. This power is to be found in paragraph 2(b) of Rule 3.4 of the Civil
Procedure Rules, which envisages the striking out of a statement of case where it amounts to ‘an
abuse of the court's process’.105 A Practice Direction explains that this criterion is satisfied where a
statement of claim is ‘vexatious, scurrilous or obviously ill-founded’, but there is no more precise
definition. Lord Bingham has suggested that an abuse occurs where a plaintiff has been ‘using that
process for a purpose, or in a way significantly different from its ordinary and proper use’.106 The
action *Comms. L. 181 becomes ‘merely a stalking horse to coerce the defendant in some way
entirely outside the ambit of the legal claim upon which the court is asked to adjudicate’.107 Thus, even
a claim with an apparent foundation in the law of tort may be struck out should a judge deem such
action appropriate. The power has been exercised where a claimant has brought proceedings with no
intention of bringing them to a conclusion.108 It might also be utilised in the face of SLAPPs.
Providing defendants with the means to ‘win the case’, however, is not the crux of the issue. The
unusual feature of SLAPPs is that their bite is most often felt prior to the substantive question
reaching court. Many potential defendants will seek to escape the courtroom, and will do so by
capitulating to the threat. They will self-censor their future contribution to the public sphere. Many
claimants will forego the action as hearing dates approach. The courts have recognised that the fact
of being sued at all can be a serious interference with the freedom of expression. What becomes vital
is the existence of some disincentive to the intimidatory legal suit being brought in the first place.
One practical ramification of any signal by the court that it will be watchful for deleterious actions
would be to deter prospective SLAPP claimants from that course of action. A more proactive option,
however, would be for defendants to be allowed some means to counter-sue the claimant both to
recover costs expended and to obtain damages on account of the breach of expression rights. The
prospect that the defendant might ‘SLAPP-back’ would immediately see a prospective claimant pause
to reconsider the advisability of bringing an intimidatory action.
It may be possible for the courts to develop the torts of ‘malicious civil proceedings’, and ‘abuse of
process’ so as to provide defendants with a cause of action in these circumstances, but legislative
intervention would be preferable. By deciding not to transpose Article 13 ECHR into domestic law,
Parliament has resiled from providing a general cause of action available in the case of breach of
Convention rights. In contrast, a large number of US States have introduced anti-SLAPP legislation.
Indeed, the more aggressive forms of the libel tourism legislation mooted currently in the US - those
that would allow recovery of costs and counter-damage claims - stand as exemplars in this specific
context. Clearly, such legislation would raise Article 6 ECHR access to justice issues, which would
need to be balanced against the Article 10 considerations. It may be, however, that legislation to
provide for such counter-suits may be considered desirable and necessary in the libel context.
Certainly, it has recently been lamented that such deterrent measures are not available to the victims
Page12
of ‘spurious’ libel actions brought in the British courts.109 Again, we recommend that the government
working party on libel reform attend to this option.
Conclusion
In our consideration of the various proposals for the reform of the libel regime in England and Wales
we have sought to identify those options that are worthy of deeper examination in appropriate policy
forums. We aimed to differentiate such options from the raft of other suggestions which, if put into
effect in some manner, would likely not address perceived problems and/or would have significant
deleterious repercussions. Specifically, we consider that proposals to revise the existing rules on
jurisdiction; to improve the public interest defence; to broaden the defence of fair comment; to exempt
internet hosts and online interactive chat from liability; to reallocate the burden of proof as to
truth/falsity, and to cap libel damages are each best treated as culs de sac.
In contrast, we have concluded that other suggestions for reform that have emerged out of the
critique of libel are potentially of substance, and deserve more full examination. These include points
regarding the introduction of a single publication rule for online publication; the introduction of a
specialised libel tribunal or other cost-saving process change; the denial of standing to corporate
entities; relieving the costs burden, and the contemplation of legislation to permit defendants to
counter-sue abusive libel claimants. Ultimately, we hope that we have identified those areas of libel
law and procedure that might be the focus of constructive revision in defence of freedom of
expression, while still facilitating vindication of the social and personal importance of reputation.
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